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ABSTRACT
Inspired by the World Wide Web, the Web of Data is a network of
interlinked data fragments. One of the main advantages of the Web
of Data is that all of its content is processable bymachines. However,
this also has its drawbacks when it comes to monetization of the
content: advertisements and donations—two important financial
motors in the World Wide Web—do not translate into the Web of
Data as they rely on exposing the user to advertisement/call for
donations.
The remedy this situation, we propose two different monetiza-
tion strategies for the Web of Data. The first strategy involves a
marketplace where users can buy data in an integrated way. The
second strategy allows third parties to promote certain data. In
return, the sponsors pay money whenever a user follows a link
contained in the sponsored data. We identified two different kind of
data—commercial and sponsored data—which can benefit from the
two respective monetization strategies. With our work, we propose
solutions to the problem of financing the creation and maintenance
of content in the Web of Data.
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1 PROBLEM
The Web of Data (WoD) is an extension of the World Wide Web
(WWW) to facilitate the exchange and processing of data which
is distributed over the Web. In the WoD, data is exposed using
a machine-processable, semantically annotated data model, the
Resource Description Framework (RDF) data model. Using this data
model,machines can access data autonomously on behalf of humans
according to some task specifications. Another advantage of the
RDF data model is that data sources can be queried in a federated
fashion without agreeing on a common scheme beforehand. Even
though the WoD is an extension of the WWW, accessing data in the
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WoD is more similar to querying one big, decentralized database
than browsing web pages. Whilst this has the before-mentioned
advantages, it also has its disadvantages. One of these disadvan-
tages is that most monetization strategies for data publishers from
the WWW do not translate easily to the WoD. Typical monetiza-
tion strategies in the WWW include advertisement, donations, and
subsidies.
Advertisement is arguably the biggest financial motor in the
WWW. The WWW offers the opportunity to customize advertise-
ment to the user and target specific user groups in a way unprece-
dented in any other media. A publisher of Web content can embed
ads into the presentation of the actual content to create the required
impressions (which may be converted into clicks and actions) for
which the advertiser is paying. If we would want to translate this
advertisement mechanism to the WoD, we would need a way to
embed advertisement into the presentation of the RDF data. How-
ever, unlike the markup language HTML, the RDF data model does
not provide the means to dictate how certain data elements should
be presented to the user. Indeed, the mere concept of machine-
processable data opposes the idea of exposing the consumer of the
data (which could be a human or a machine) to advertisement. For
example, the query language SPARQL [11], which can be used to
query RDF data, allows to project a query answer to a set of vari-
ables which are of interest. Thus, meta-data like advertisement can
easily be filtered out. Of course, it is always possible to introduce
advertisement at the interface between the human and the machine
which accesses the WoD. However, such advertisements would be
controlled by the publisher of the respective interface and not by
the publisher of the original data. The data publisher would not
benefit from such an advertisement strategy, which is the main
concern of our research.
Donations are another important source of money in the WWW.
This monetization strategy relies on users’ appreciation of the Web
content to a degree where they are voluntarily donating money to
keep the service alive. If a publisher wants to finance its service
through donations, a crucial part is to make the consumers aware of
the need of financial support and instruct them how to donate. This
problem should not be underestimated. As [6] shows, a significant
part of the users is not aware that there is a possibility to donate to
Wikipedia1, a website which is mainly financed through donations,
or do not know how to donate. To remedy this situation, publishers
which do rely on donations occasionally put banners on their web-
sites to call for donations, for example. In the WoD, this problem is
much more pronounced. Similar to what we have already discussed
about advertisement, it is also not straightforward to embed calls
1http://www.wikipedia.org
for donations into RDF data. In the end, calls for donations can be
seen as a kind of advertisement where the advertiser is also the
publisher. In addition, users might simply not be aware that they are
using the data of a certain publisher, especially if the data is part of
a federation. Even if the RDF data contains some attribution about
the source of the data, similar to advertisement, such meta-data can
be filtered out. As a result, publishers in the WoD might not be able
to create the required awareness to trigger donations.
Besides advertisement and donations, subsidies play also an
important role in financing Web content. Unlike the former two,
subsidies do actually also apply to the WoD setting. Most current
datasets on the WoD which are not maintained by enthusiasts
are subsidized either by governments via data access laws or by
research grants. However, subsidies cannot be considered an actual
monetization strategy, as they basically delegate the problem to
somebody else.
Problem statement: Without new monetization strategies,
many promising datasets will be poorly maintained or disappear
as there will be not enough funds to keep the data up-to-date and
the servers running. To solve this problem, we identify, model, and
evaluate two new monetization strategies for the WoD.
The first monetization strategy focuses on the consumer of the
WoD data to finance the data publishers. In the second monetization
strategy a third party, the sponsor, finances the data. These two
monetization strategies can be applied to two different types of
data: The former strategy is applicable to data for which a consumer
is willing to pay, which we will call commercial data. The latter
strategy is applicable to data some sponsor is willing to promote,
which we will call sponsored data.
2 STATE OF THE ART
The state of the art can be divided into two parts: Data Markets and
Sponsored Search Auctions.
2.1 Data Markets
The idea to charge customers for accessing data is already im-
plemented in the WWW. Bloomberg2, LexisNexis3, and Thomson
Reuters4 charge customers high fees for accessing their data, pri-
marily using subscription-based models. All these examples have
in common that they can sell their whole data offering charging
quasi-monopolistic prices [2]. Also, for relational databases, mar-
kets have been proposed which sell data using arbitrage-free pricing
schemes [4, 12]. In the work of [17], the negative externalities of
giving away data are considered when selling them using an auction
mechanism.
Unfortunately, none of these marketplaces allow a customer to
join datasets from different providers, which is an important aspect
of the WoD scenario we are investigating. In addition, to the best
of our knowledge, none of these marketplaces considers partial
answers due to value or budget constraints.
In a pilot study, [19] laid the foundation of our research by
simulating a marketplace for the WoD. In [13], we first introduced
the idea of using a double-auction to sell data on the WoD. Finally,
2http://www.bloomberg.com
3http://www.lexisnexis.com
4http://www.thomsonreuters.com
in [10] we introduced our model for a marketplace which allows
customers to buy data from decentralized sellers in an integrated
way. In contrast to previous models, we focused on maximizing the
customers utility given all available data.
2.2 Sponsored Search Auctions
The Generalized Second Price (GSP), which was introduced by
Google in 2002 and replaced the first price models, became an
industry standard for sponsored search auctions [18]. The main
advantage of the GSP auction is that it prevents “cycling” patterns,
a situation where repeatedly prices gradually rise and then sud-
denly drop [5]. Another alternative to first price models is the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction [3, 7, 16]. This auction has
the advantage of being truthful, meaning that no bidder has an
incentive to lie about his or her valuation of the outcome of the
auction. [1] proposed a new auction mechanism where bidders can
impose additional constraints on the exact location where they
want their ad to appear, as a bidder might have a value for the mere
appearance of the ad, even if the ad is not clicked by the user.
So far, none of these auction models have been applied to the
WoD setting. One reason is that, as discussed in Section 1, online
advertisement from the WWW does not translate to the WoD.
However, as we have shown in [9], the auction techniques can
nevertheless be applied in the WoD setting, although not in the
way they were originally designed for.
3 PROPOSED APPROACH
Our basic approach is to formulate two differentmonetization strate-
gies for commercial and sponsored data.
The main characteristics of commercial data is that the consumer
has a higher value for consuming the data than any other entity
(including, but not limited to, the data publisher) has in exposing
the customer to the data. The value indicates the willingness to
pay for consuming and exposing the data, respectively. Examples
of commercial data are data about consumer behaviors or stock
exchange data.
The main characteristics of sponsored data is that there is an
entity, which we call the sponsor, that has a higher value for expos-
ing the consumer to the data than the consumer has for consuming
the data. Sponsored data is basically any data which is typically
included in advertisements. In contrast to traditional advertisement,
however, sponsored data is explicitly requested by the consumer
and does not represent additional information or even a distraction
from the requested data. Examples of sponsored data are informa-
tion about hotels and restaurants or data about goods for sale.
3.1 A Marketplace for Commercial Data
To answer the first research question, we propose a marketplace for
commercial data in the WoD. The main feature of our marketplace
is that a customer can combine data from different data publishers
in an integrated way, which means that the customer can access
the data of all participating data publishers as if there would be
only one big database. The customer does not have to pay for all
the available data, however. Instead, a customer can submit a query
and will be charged only for those triples (the smallest possible
data fragments) which are precisely needed to form a certain query
answer. In addition, the customer can decide how small or big the
query answer should be.
Without using such a marketplace, a user would have to buy
individual triples directly from the different data publishers. While
this is possible, there is a major drawback of this approach when
data from more than one data publisher have to be joined: It is very
hard for the customer to estimate which triples of one publisher
will actually join with the triples of another publisher. Hence, a
customer might either waste money on triples which do not join
or miss a part of the query answer because some triples were not
bought. As we have shown in [8], join estimation techniques are
suffering a lot from false-positive matches in the WoD setting and
hence, we cannot expect that a customer would be able to use such
techniques to buy exactly those triples which are needed to form
a specific query answer. Only a query execution can reveal the
true contribution and value of the publishers’ triples. Hence, we
argue that a market for the WoD has to execute a given query on
the publishers’ data before the decision can be made which triples
should be bought by the customer. Figure 1 shows the necessary
steps in our marketplace:
(1) The marketplace receives a query from the customer and
executes it on the available data.
(2) Only a certain part of the complete query answer is chosen
by the customer.
(3) The customer only pays the marketplace the indicated price
of the selected triples.
My first research question focuses on the customer’s buying
decision, which we call the allocation problem:
RQ1 How to solve the allocation problem for a market for the
WoD efficiently?
3.2 A Delayed-Answer Auction for Sponsored
Data
For the second research question, we propose a slot-auction similar
to the auctions used for sponsored search results. In this auction,
sponsors pay money if a user follows a certain link contained in a
query answer. To motivate sponsors to pay for such link visits, we
need a way to prioritize those links which receive a higher bid from
those links with lower or no bid. For this, we introduce delays into
the delivery of the query answer. Records containing links with
high bids are delivered more quickly than the records with lower
bids. By introducing such different delays, we create a ranking of
the different records of a query answer. The ranking we introduce
works similar to the rankings of advertisement slots in sponsored
search results. Hence, we can apply the auction techniques which
originate from sponsored search auctions to this new setting.
Figure 2 illustrates the process of our new auction concept. Like
in the marketplace from Section 3.1, we have a user who submits
a query to our system and the query gets executed on the data
of all participating publishers. This time, however, the user does
not select a part of the query answer. Instead, the complete query
answer is delivered to the user. Different delays are assigned to the
different records of the query answer, depending on how much the
sponsors bid on certain links contained in the records. Records with
less delay have a higher chance of being considered by the user
Data Data
Marketplace Customer
Data Data
Query Execution
Query
1.
2.
Data Data
Marketplace Customer
Data Data
Payment3.
Selected
Query Answer
Buying Decision
Complete Query Answer Selected Query Answer
Figure 1: The three steps from a query to the selected query
answer.
Provider
RDF Data
Auction User
Provider
RDF Data
Sponsor
Delay
Delay
Delay
Query Answer
Bid Query
Query
Execution
Figure 2: A user gets a delayed query answer based on the
bids of sponsors.
and hence, the likelihood of a link visit is higher. If the user visits a
certain link, the sponsor has to pay a certain price to the auctioneer.
The prices are calculated using the VCG mechanism [3, 7, 16].
The second research question asks about the influence of the
delays on the proposed auction:
RQ2 How does the choice of the delays influence the proposed
delayed-answer auction?
4 METHODOLOGY
The methodology of our research is slightly different for the two
research questions.
4.1 Marketplace for Commercial Data
For the marketplace for commercial data, different parts of the
market have to bemodelled. The first part models how the necessary
meta-data can be extracted from the different data publishers during
query execution (part 1 in Figure 1). In our model, the publishers’
data is organized into data products. A data product is a collection of
RDF triples that all have the same meta-data (including the price).
We use RDF statements to describe the meta-data about a data
product. This allows us to access the data and the meta-data of the
data products using a single, federated SPARQL query. Additionally,
a user can use the meta-data directly in the query to restrict the
query answer based on the specific needs.
A second important aspect of our model for the marketplace is
the selection of the query answer (part 2 in Figure 1). Choosing an
appropriate subset of the complete query answer can be modelled
as an integer programming problem, assuming that the value for
the query answer is a linear function with respect to the containing
records. However, solving such a problem is NP-hard. If the value
is not linear but monotonically decreasing, we cannot formulate
the problem as an integer programming problem.
The query execution of our marketplace is implemented using
the federated querying engine FedX [15]. In traditional federated
SPARQL query execution, a SPARQL query is split up into sub-
queries which are sent to different sources. Combining the query
answers from the different subqueries results in the complete query
answer. Instead of sending the subqueries directly to the endpoints,
we have to rewrite each subquery to retrieve also all meta-data
about the different data products.
The selection of the query answer is implemented using two
different approaches: (1) Using the commercial solver CPLEX5.
This approach is only possible if the selection can be modelled as
an integer programming problem. (2) Using our own greedy algo-
rithm. This approach is also possible if the value is monotonically
decreasing.
To evaluate the two different approaches, we are using two
different metrics: the runtime of the algorithms (which establishes
their feasibility) and the quality of their selection. The quality of
a specific selection of a query answer is expressed by its utility,
which is the value a user has for a specific selection minus the price
the customer has to pay.
4.2 Delayed-Answer Auction
The model for the delayed-answer auction is based on the slot auc-
tions for sponsored search results. In this model, we have different
slots with decreasing likelihood of being selected by the user. Since
a query answer is a set of records, there is no inherent ordering of
the different records and hence, all records have initially the same
likelihood of being selected. To create such an ordering artificially,
we have to introduce different delays for different records. Each
record inside a query answer gets assigned to a specific slot which
determines the delay.
5https://www.ibm.com/jm-en/marketplace/ibm-ilog-cplex
Even though our delayed-answer auction is similar to sponsored
search auctions, we need a new click model for this new setting.
The model we are using assumes that a user is able to judge the
relevancy of a link upon receiving the query answer and hence, will
visit at most one link. Unlike links in the WWW, in the WoD, the
user can judge the relevancy of a link by the information embedded
in the query answer.
The delays for the different records are important parameters
of our auction which have to be chosen by the auctioneer. These
parameters add a new dimensionality to the slot auctions and do
not have any counterpart in traditional slot auctions used in spon-
sored search auctions. Hence, it is crucial to understand how these
parameters influence the auction and how an auctioneer can opti-
mize on them. Hence, we perform a theoretical analysis of how the
parameters can be optimized. In addition, we perform simulations
which illustrates the choice of the parameters on social welfare (the
total generated wealth) and revenue for the auctioneer.
5 RESULTS
We will now briefly sketch some of the results we already obtained
for the two scenarios: the marketplace for commercial data (Re-
search Question RQ1) and the delayed-answer auction (Research
Question RQ2).
5.1 Marketplace for Commercial Data
To evaluate the two different approaches sketched in Section 4.1,
we tested both algorithms on 17 FedBench [14] queries. We used
the metrics described in Section 4.1 for this evaluation.
With respect to the utility, the first approach using CPLEX and
the second approach using our greedy algorithm are very close to
each other. We observed that our greedy algorithm reaches more
than 90% of the utility of CPLEX in 15 out of 17 queries. For the
other two queries, our greedy algorithm reached at least 80%. At
the same time, the greedy algorithm runs in most cases between 1
and 3 orders of magnitude faster than CPLEX. Figure 3 compares
the approach using CPLEX, which we call the Integer Rule, and our
own algorithm, which we call the Greedy Rule.
In a different evaluation, we showed that CPLEX is very sensitive
to the diversity of the query answer and that for some parameter
ranges, CPLEX is not able to find an optimal solution within a
time-limit of 12 hours.
As our results show, the two approaches under investigation—
Integer Rule and Greedy Rule—can be used to solve the allocation
problem. While using CPLEX guarantees an optimal solution, our
own algorithm can achieve similar results in a much shorter time-
frame, usually. This gives an answer to Research Question RQ1:
The allocation problem can in most cases solved efficiently with
both approaches. In some cases, the Integer Rule is superior to the
Greedy Rule. In most cases, however, the Greedy Rule can be a good
and fast alternative. Finally, for some cases, the Integer Rule is not
feasible due to the excessive runtime.
5.2 Delayed-Answer Auction
We analyzed the properties of the delayed-answer auction and
found that in general it is not possible to optimize both revenue and
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Figure 3: Runtime in seconds when using CPLEX (Integer) and our own algorithm (Greedy) for the FedBench benchmark.
social welfare with the same set of parameters for the delays. Opti-
mal revenue and optimal social welfare have in common that they
both require that part of the query answer is delayed indefinitely.
Such an approach might damp the user’s experience, however, who
only receives part of all available data. Our simulations showed
that the parameters for optimizing revenue and optimizing social
welfare differ a lot when there are is a small set of bids which are
much higher than the remaining bids.
The analysis gives a good overview of the influence of the choice
of the parameters for the auction and thus, answers Research Ques-
tion RQ2.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
To create financial incentives to publish content in the Web of Data,
we proposed two different strategies, one for commercial and one
for sponsored data. As discussed in Section 5, we already established
some results regarding these two strategies.
For the first strategy, we compared two different ways how a
consumer can select a subset of a query answer and compared their
performance with respect to runtime and utility. What is left for
future work is to investigate how data providers can determine the
best price for their data. We believe that such optimal price can
be learned, for example by using reinforced learning techniques.
We also need to explore how well subscription-based models can
be applied to our new setting. Finally, our marketplace offers new
possibilities for market-aware query optimizations which considers
the costs we impose on the data providers by executing queries on
their servers.
For the second strategy, we already did a theoretical analysis
of our auction setting and a simulation which showed some inter-
esting properties of our model. However, we are still missing an
evaluation of our method using real-world data. For this, we plan to
use datasets from traditional ad auctions for web search. We have
to investigate how these datasets can be applied to our new setting.
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